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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
The Grenada Committee Report
Dear Editor:
The shock wave that hit this country and much of the rest of the world
when the news was flashed of the United States-Caribbean States military
intervention in Grenada October 25, 1983, quickly produced an amazing
outpouring of news, commentary and analysis regarding that event.
Attempts to blame, explain and declaim United States actions could be
found in journalistic sources, congressional hearings and scholarly periodicals. This writer, although certain to have missed some of the pieces brought
before the public, has made a special effort to familiarize himself with this
production and has found no single article yet to compare with the scholarship and judgments made by the Committee on Grenada of the American
Bar Association. (Committee on Grenada:-Edward Gordon, chairman,
Richard B. Bilder, Arthur W. Rovine, Don Wallace, Jr., InternationalLaw
and the United States Action in Grenada: A Report, 18 INT'L LAWYER
331(1984)) (hereafter cited as Gordon Report). Although some critical
comments will be offered regarding specifics of the Gordon et al analysis,
there is no question that it will remain a high watermark in the effort by legal
scholars to combine an historical commentary with a delineation of the legal
issues, and to bring to bear the weight of scholarship of the legal community
and the findings of the courts in those cases of relevance to the Grenada
episode. So much of the writing, including that of the members of the
academic community has been polemical, disguised as scholarship, that a
sense of d~jii vu is rekindled with thoughts of similar debates on the Vietnam
War. Gordon's committee has gone beyond the confines of the issue as set
forth by the United States Department of State, but that is not to their
discredit for their assignment was to explore the legal issues as they pertain
to the entire "affaire Grenada." While they may not have done this in every
instance, they are by no means to be faulted for not restricting themselves to
the Department's claims of rights reiterated in the response by Davis Robinson, the Department's Legal Adviser. As we move seriatim through the
Committee's Report, the following commentary seems appropriate,
although not all points are of equal weight.
In reference to the seven-member Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States, the authors list eight names, which to the uninitiated may be confusing. Barbuda is mentioned separately from Antigua, of which it is administratively a part. (Gordon Report, at 337, n.7.) The records are still not clear
whether the absence of Montserrat and St. Kitts-Nevis signatures regarding
the decision to intervene reflect a degree of disagreement with the interven-
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tion, or the unwillingness to send troops. It certainly would be naive to
assume that the latter governments could not have spared any individuals to
serve as part of the occupying force, or that the United States would not
have been willing to foot their bill. It would also be important to note what
monies, if any, have been set aside to meet each government's costs in
participating in the intervention, and whether any United States funds were
provided to offset these costs. Further examination will have to be undertaken to answer these questions.
The size of the military buildup in Grenada as well as the airport project
became a major rallying point against Grenada by President Reagan and all
of the governments which participated in the military action. But this matter
needs to be much further explored. In the first place all governments
acknowledge that they were not as aware of the extent of the buildup before
the landings as they were after. Second, as the authors note, many of the
other islands whose governments intervened had airports with even larger
runways, one of which, Barbados, allowed Cuba to use it as a refueling
station on its way to Angola without producing any retribution by the
United States. And that same Grenada airport which was denounced by the
Reagan Administration as being economically unnecessary, the whole
world now knows is being given top priority by this same U.S. administration.
However, the larger question is whether Grenada was perceived by the
other island states as a threat and whether the members of the OECS under
their treaty or whether the non-OECS members who participated in the
intervention, namely, Barbados, Jamaica, and the United States, violated
the terms of the Organization of American States treaty or the United
Nations Charter.
This reviewer is in complete accord with the record presented by the
Gordon Committee and its interpretation of these various treaties. The
Committee's stress on reducing the incidence of force in world affairs and
the threat or application thereof as evidenced in the debates and terms of the
League of Nations Covenant,-he-ellog-Briand Pact and the other similar
international agreements in which the United States government was such
an active participant, is critical in this regard. The authors are to be commended for providing this brief historical account for it reminds the reader
what the essential condition in these undertakings was assumed to be in the
effort to build a more peaceful and law-abiding world. Every legal scholar
knows that there may be more than one approach to the interpretation of a
treaty or agreement, but one of the most beneficial is to reiterate the intent
of the framers. The essence of this historical struggle had been to reduce the
incidence and reliance on force in international relations, and interpretations that truly support that approach are to be commended.
However, the Gordon Report criticism of the participating states' beVOL. 18, NO. 3
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havior is merited on an equally important and tangential aspect of the issue,
namely the extent to which the provisions of each of the relevant treaties
were met by those participants. These provisions require efforts to reach
political settlement of disagreements before any military action is justifiedan effort that to a very considerable extent appears to be missing from the
record. Gordon et al. make note of this but do not explore it in detail. Let us
briefly do so.
From March 13, 1979 when the New Jewel Movement overthrew the
Gairy government until October 1983 there is no record of any of the
participants of the Grenada intervention raising a formal protest about the
size of the military buildup in Grenada, calling for any special meeting to
deal with the assumed threat to their security or even placing an accusatory
item on the agenda at meetings of the OECS, OAS or UN. At interviews
which this reviewer has had with officials of the island governments involved, references were made to critical comments made to Bishop at
CARICOM meetings regarding the lack of elections in Grenada and the
close ties with Cuba. But no one referred to protests that had been made or
expressions of fear or danger arising from Grenada's military power. In fact,
it is reported that when Reagan called a Caribbean Summit Conference in
Barbados, April 9, 1982, some strong differences emerged between President Reagan and Prime Minister Adams regarding Grenada in which
Adams is reported to have said that the Caribbean nations did not perceive
Grenada as a military danger. The essential point is that any claims of the
right to collective security action which the Eastern Caribbean states put
forth is seriously undermined by the omission of the appropriate procedural
steps provided in Article 8 of the OECS Treaty, Articles 23-26 of the OAS
Treaty and Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Although the authors of the
ABA Committee Report do not suggest it, it wculd be interesting to
speculate what the position of the International Court of Justice or some
other competent juridical body might have been, had Grenada raised
charges of its rights being violated under any of the above treaties.
Perhaps the most serious omission in the Gordon Committee study pertains to the status of the office of the Governor-General. It is not that the
Committee did not recognize the importance of the question, but being
aware of its intricacies they decided to forgo any serious attempt to explore
it. There is no space here for this reviewer to fill the gap but he has attempted
to do so elsewhere. (M. Waters, Grenada 1983: Liberation? Invasion?
Collective Security? Collective Intervention?Whose Rights Are Right?, paper
presented at the Caribbean Studies Association, IX Annual Meeting, St.
Kitts, West Indies, May 1984.) Not only is the claim of the many governments which have commented on the issue open to question, but none has
put forth serious arguments as to why Sir Paul Scoon had authority to act as
he allegedly did.
Summer 1984
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As the ABA Committee Report notes, and as this reviewer has concluded
from interviews held with officials of the United States and other governments, the claim is made that Sir Paul Scoon as Governor-General had
authority to act in seeking assistance in restoring "law and order" in Grenada. The issue of whether his action occurred prior to, during or subsequent to the military intervention is not addressed by the report, and neither
will it be by this reviewer. The more critical issue is one of competence. As
Gordon's report points out, the 1973 Grenada Constitution states that the
executive authority is vested in the Queen and is exercised on her behalf by
the Governor-General. The meaning of the term "executive authority" is
nowhere spelled out and writers on the British and Commonwealth constitutional system do not take the position that there is any significant grant of
authority established thereby. (For greater discussion on- this point see
Waters, Caribbean Studies Association paper, op. cit., pp. 5-9.)
In fact, Sir Paul in his own assessment of his role expressed in an interview
referred to in the Report is reported to have stated that he was conscious of
the fact that "my job is more or less just a ceremonial one . . ." And

whatever the assessment is of his authority under the 1973 Constitution, that
document had been suspended under The People's Laws of the Bishop
administration. From 1979 on, he was subservient to the People's Revolutionary Government and the functions it assigned. Thus, although he may
still have been representative of the Queen in her "executive authority", it
seems obvious that that was a titular position which if it carried any authority
at all was not pertinent to the functions "assigned" by outside states in
October 1983. It seems much more logical to construe the term "executive
authority" as representing an "office" in October 1983 rather than a
"power".
Once again the Gordon Committee elucidates the nature of the problem.
If the office is to be construed as one with power, i.e. the authority to act, we
are then confronted with the situation of a divided government. On the one
hand we have Austin's Revolutionary Military Council which is attempting
to set up a new constitution and government and which has de facto control
in the island, and on the other hand Scoon who apparently has set himself up
in opposition to Austin and wants him and his council removed. Thus we
have an embryonic condition of a civil war-at least a government that is
internally divided. Under those circumstances, as Gordon et al. note, customary international law requires outsiders to refrain from interfering, and
the American regional position even more heavily emphasizes this view.
This conclusion is even more significant if one considers the United States
record of involvement from October 19th on. According to the testimony of
Kenneth Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, and Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, our official contacts were always
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with Austin and his representatives. Even when our Barbados based
embassy staff went to Grenada with the Deputy British High Commissioner,
they spoke with Austin's representatives while David Montgomery of the
High Commission staff met with Scoon. Thus, we gave de facto recognition
to Austin while we intervened on behalf of Scoon.
There are two final points deserving of comment in the ABA Committee
study. One pertains to the widespread report that a secret treaty exists
between Barbados and the participating Eastern Caribbean states which
provided the basis for the decision to invade Grenada. (Was this the true
basis for the action rather than the OECS Treaty?) If such a treaty exists it is
not only an unregistered treaty but more important a secret one. Thus, its
legal nature is highly questionable. In fact one may go further and suggest
that the reports regarding its objectives would seem to indicate that it runs
contrary to international law as provided under the UN and the OAS
Charters. There is no indication of any mediating machinery to deal with
disputes and furthermore the reports concerning it indicate that it may be
implemented at any time against any (member?) government whose leadership is about to be or has been overthrown. This would be a violation of
Article 2, Sections 4 and 7 of the UN Charter as well as Chaper VI, and of
Chapter IV of the OAS Charter. It is to be admitted that the existence of
such a treaty and of course its terms, in addition to the question of whether it
was operative in the Grenada intervention is unsubstantiated. Nevertheless,
the dangers that are inherent in this possible arrangement cannot be ignored
by the international community. This obviously includes the United States
which less than any of the other actors involved can claim self defense as the
motivating factor for its participation. More intensive scholarship of the
quality represented by the Gordon Committee Report is needed if those
questions are to be answered and if the long standing struggle to provide
principles of international justice is to continue.
Dr. Maurice Waters
Professor of Political Science
Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan
Dear Maurice:
Many applauded the Gordon Report as a scholarly, objective and sensible
analysis. Your additionalthoughts are helpful and appreciated.
REL
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Japan's Unwritten Law and TIL's Uncitely Pages
Dear Editor:
Lansing and Wecselblatt's apologia for Unwritten Law in Japan (Vol. 17,
no. 4) could better be expressed as a haiku also applicable to other countries
with underdeveloped legal systems
Even signed
Words are only words
Not bonds
Let's talk, again
Some practitioners have more pungent terms for this practice than found in
academe.
Also, please can you mark the cite (Volume, month) on each note in every
InternationalLawyer. For those who tear out articles by subject it is impossible to cite you.
Thomas B. Trumpy
Resident Counsel
Obermayer, Rebmann,
Maxwell & Hippel
Brussels, Belgium
Dear Tom:
Thank you for your idea. I beat you to it, however. As you will note,
starting with vol. 18, no. 1, each page is so marked.
REL
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